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Levying on Joint Bank Accounts: A Ticking Bomb
for the Nondelinquent Joint Account Holder
The Internal Revenue Service is currently experiencing
great difficulty in reducing the government's massive delinquent tax receivable. At the end of fiscal year 1983, the amount
of delinquent taxes owed to the Treasury totaled $23.4 billion.During the ensuing fiscal year, the Service wrote off $757 million of the delinquent tax receivable because the statutory period for collection had expired. 2 The amount of delinquent
intaxes outstanding at the end of fiscal year 1984, moreover,
3
creased approximately twenty-six percent to $29.4 billion.
The Service is under great pressure to collect these delinquent taxes. 4 Congress, confronted with a growing federal defi1. Treasury,Postal Service, and GeneralGovernment Appropriationsfor
Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings on H.R. 3036 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 387 (1985) (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter cited
as 1985 Senate Hearings].
2. IdMat 389. Pursuant to § 6502(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the
Service is provided a six-year period from the date of formal assessment of the
tax to collect the outstanding balance. See I.R.C. § 6502(a) (1982); infra note
17 and accompanying text.
3. 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 387 (statement of Roscoe L.
Egger, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service). Commissioner Egger attributed the $6 billion increase to the overall growth in the economy and the
significant increases in withholding and social security taxes. Id at 387-88.
4. In response to questions regarding the Service's plans for stemming
the continued growth in delinquent taxes, Commissioner Egger responded:
We are continually reviewing our procedures to find ways to improve
our collection process. The office automation efforts we described
earlier will be our major thrust over the next several years in improving our collection programs. In addition, we are improving procedures
in other areas. For example, we are developing data bases that can
help locate delinquent taxpayers and identify levy sources. This includes information from third parties as well as improved access to
and use of information within [the] IRS. We plan to improve the
processing timeliness of information returns as leads for levy sources
on individuals. We are looking into using similar returns as leads to
levy sources on business taxpayers. We also plan to use the leads
more effectively for locating delinquent taxpayers.
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriationsfor Fiscal
Year 1985: HearingsBefore a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 212-13 (1984) (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.,
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Senate
Hearings].
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cit,5 has once again focused its attention on tax reform as a
means of alleviating the government's financial problems. 6 In
the scramble to locate sources of federal revenues, the billions
of dollars of delinquent taxes have not escaped scrutiny and
criticism.

7

This Note examines one of the Service's most powerful
tools of collection, the administrative levy procedure. Part I
outlines the statutory provisions that facilitate the timely collection of tax revenues, focusing on the lien-foreclosure and administrative levy sections of the Code. Part II reviews a recent
Supreme Court decision that extended the Service's broad
power to levy on funds held in joint bank accounts. Part III
suggests that neither the administrative levy procedure, as interpreted by the Court, nor the statutory remedies for wrongful
levy provide the nondelinquent codepositor with adequate procedural due process. Part IV then analyzes the Service's increased use of the administrative levy and discusses how
Congress, although cognizant of the problem, has failed to mitigate the expanding risk of injury to nondelinquent codepositors
resulting from this increased application. This Note concludes
that, in light of the significant increase in the Service's use of
the administrative levy on joint bank accounts, the nondelin5. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that the United States government would incur a deficit of approximately $167 billion during fiscal 1985.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE, TREASURY BULLETIN 3 (4th Quarter, Fiscal
1984).
Recently, the Senate approved and sent to the House a bill raising the
government's borrowing authority above $2 trillion. As a reporter for The
Wall Street Journal noted:

The proposed debt ceiling of $2.079 trillion represents a $255 billion
increase necessary to carry the government through [fiscal year 1986]
and compares with the $935.1 billion debt President Reagan inherited
when he took office in 1981. Though the administration promised
then to balance the budget by 1984, the proposed ceiling is $1 trillion
above the fiscal 1982 debt ceiling incorporated in Mr. Reagan's first
budget.
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
6. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, was
"designed to raise over $50 billion in revenue as part of a deficit reduction
package of tax increases and spending cuts." COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, EXPLANATION OF TAx REFORM ACT OF 1984 2 (1984).
7. For a discussion of a 1980 congressional report criticizing the Service's
collection practices relating to small businesses, see infra notes 172-179 and accompanying text. The General Accounting Office has also strongly criticized
the Service's delinquent tax collection policies and procedures. See GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WHAT IRS CAN Do To COLLECT MORE DELINQUENT
TAXES (1981); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS SEIZURE OF TAXPAYER
PROPERTY: EFFECTIVE, BUT NOT UNIFORMLY APPLIED (1978).
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quent joint account holder should receive stronger procedural
protection.
I.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE COLLECTION
PROVISIONS

Congress has given the Internal Revenue Service "formidable power to act summarily to collect and protect the public
revenues." Pending an adjudicatory hearing, 9 the Service may
create a lien upon, and, if necessary, seize all of the delinquent
taxpayer's property and rights to property1 0

A.

FEDERAL TAX LIENS

If a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay any tax within ten
days after notice and demand by the Service, section 6321 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that the unpaid amount, including any interest or civil penalties, becomes a lien in favor of
the United States "upon all property and rights to property"
belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.1 1 Three events must occur before a general tax lien attaches under section 6321: the
Service first must make a tax assessment;12 the Service then
8. McGregor & Davenport, Collection of Delinquent Federal Taxes, 28 S.
CAL. TAx INST. 589, 614 (1976).
9. McGregor and Davenport note that "[ifn the case of proposed assessments of disputed income, gift, estate, and private foundation excise taxes, the
taxpayer will have the opportunity to litigate for redetermination of the deficiency by the Tax Court before collection efforts may be undertaken." Id& at
614 n.55.
10. Id. at 614.
11. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). Section 6321 provides as follows:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount,
addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that
may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
Id. For a detailed analysis of the federal tax lien, see generally 4 B. BrrTKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcOME, ESTATES AND GnaTS 1 111.5.4 (1981); M. SALT7MAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
14.04-.09 (1981); McGregor & Daven-

port, supra note 8, at 614-19; Saltzman, IRS as a Creditor: Liens and Levies
Preferences, Other Creditors, Tax Levy Authority, Discharge and Removal of
Levy; Informal Arrangements, 34 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 433, 433-50 (1976).
12. Section 6201 of the Code grants the Secretary the authority to make
assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to
the tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by this title... which have not been
duly paid... at the time and in the manner provided by law." I.R.C. § 6201(a)
(1982). Pursuant to § 6203, "[t]he assessment shall be made by recording the
liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary in accordance with rules
or regulations prescribed by the Secretary." 1d. § 6203. Generally, the assess-
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must give the required notice, stating the amount of the assessment and demanding payment;1 3 finally, the taxpayer must refuse or neglect to pay the tax within the ten-day grace period.14
Once these events have occurred, however, no further government action is required to perfect the lien and to subject the
taxpayer's property to possible seizure by administrative levy.' 5
Moreover, because of the tax lien's priority status, the government need not establish its interest in the taxpayer's property
as against other creditors or persons having claims against the
taxpayer.' 6 The tax lien expires six years after the date of asment is effectuated by an assessment officer signing the summary record of as-

sessment. Treas. Reg. § 302.6203-1, T.D. 6585, 1962-1 C.B. 290, 291. The date of
the assessment is the date the summary record is signed by the officer. The
Service will provide the taxpayer with a copy of the record of assessment upon
request. Id.
The Service is authorized to assess the amount of tax reported on the taxpayer's return without any preliminary procedural steps. I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1)
(1982). Section 6213 of the Code, however, provides procedural protection to
the taxpayer if the Service makes an assessment based on a deficiency. Specifically, a taxpayer's right to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency is protected for a period of 90 days after receipt of the statutory notice of deficiency. Id § 6213(a). During this period, the Service is prohibited
from making a formal assessment under § 6201. Id. Moreover, if a petition is
filed in the Tax Court, no assessment may be entered until the court renders
its decision. Id.
13. Once the formal act of assessment has occurred, the Service must
comply with the statutory notice requirements of § 6303 of the Code. Specifically, § 6303(a) requires that
the Secretary shall, as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after
the making of an assessment of a tax... give notice to each person
liable for the unpaid tax, stating the amount and demanding payment
thereof. Such notice shall be left at the dwelling or usual place of
business of such person, or shall be sent by mail to such person's last
known address.
I.R.C. § 6303(a) (1982).
Unless the Service complies with the notice and demand provisions of
§ 6303(a), no general tax lien will attach nor can the administrative levy be
used to secure payment of the tax. See United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453,
462-63 (9th Cir. 1961); M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, q 14.06, at 14-28.
14. Technically, the taxpayer has 10 days to remit the amount assessed by
the Service. As a practical matter, however, IRS internal operating procedures
effectively provide the taxpayer considerably more than 10 days before the assessment is classified as delinquent. Saltzman, supra note 11, at 435. The Service Center computers are programmed to send out a series of notices prior to
referring the case to the local district director's collection division. I&i
15. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 14.06, at 14-27. For discussion of the
administrative levy, see infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
16. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 14.06, at 14-27. Although the language
of § 6321 permits application of the tax lien to "all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal," belonging to the taxpayer, I.R.C. § 6321
(1982), § 6323 limits the scope of the general tax lien. Specifically, § 6323(b)
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sessment if the government has not collected the tax or initiated court proceedings. 17
B. COLLECTION PROCEDURES
The section 6321 federal tax lien is not self-executing.' 8
Although the language of section 6321 authorizes the creation
of "a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property"'19 of the delinquent taxpayer, the statute is
silent as to enforcement procedures after the lien becomes effective. 20 The Service must therefore look to other provisions
of the Code for the power to collect an outstanding tax liability.
The primary2 ' collection tools are the lien-foreclosure suit 22
23
and the administrative levy.
1. Foreclosure of Tax Liens
Sections 740124 and 740325 permit the government 26

to

lists 10 classes of claimants who are protected against the federal tax lien absent actual notice. Id, § 6323(b). Moreover, Congress granted preferred priority status to those individuals making disbursements under a security
agreement entered into prior to the filing of the tax lien. Id- § 6323(d). Similarly, Congress exempted certain types of "commercial transactions financing
agreements" from the subordinating effect of § 6321. I& § 6323(c).
17. I.R.C. § 6502(a)(1) (1982). The time period can be extended, however,
if a written agreement is consummated between the Secretary and the delinquent taxpayer prior to the expiration of the initial six-year period. Id
§ 6502(a)(2). Moreover, "the period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before expiration of the period previously
agreed upon." Id § 6502(a).
18. See M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 14.07.
19. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
20. See id.
21. In addition to the lien-foreclosure suit and the administrative levy,
Congress has provided the Service with emergency procedures should it become apparent that the assessment or collection of a tax is endangered. If the
district director believes that collection of a tax would be "jeopardized by delay" if normal assessment procedures are followed, the tax may be immediately assessed and collected. I.R.C. §§ 6861(a), 6331(a) (1982). Moreover,
§ 6851 empowers the district director to truncate a taxpayer's tax year and declare the tax to be immediately due and payable if the director "finds" that
a taxpayer designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property
therein, or to do any other act... tending to prejudice or to render
wholly or partially ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax
for the current or the immediately preceding taxable year ....
Id. § 6851(a)(1).
22. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
24. Section 7401 provides: "No civil action for the collection or recovery
of taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be commenced unless the
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bring a civil action in federal district court to foreclose its tax
lien or to subject any property or property right of the delinquent taxpayer to the satisfaction of the outstanding tax liability.2 7 Under the lien-foreclosure provisions the government, as
plaintiff, is required to join as parties to the action "[a]ll persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property
involved in such action."2 8 After the interested parties have
been notified, 29 the court may adjudicate all of the issues in-

volved and determine the merits of all claims and liens on the
property.3"
Secretary authorizes or sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General or
his delegate directs that the action be commenced." I.R.C. § 7401 (1982).
25. The relevant sections of § 7403 provide:
(a) Filing
In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any
tax ... whether or not levy has been made, the Attorney General...
may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United
States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title ... or to
subject any property ... of the delinquent, or in which he has any
right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax ....
(b) Parties
All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the
property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto.
(c) Adjudication and decree
The court shall, after the parties have been duly notified of the
action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally
determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property ....
Id § 7403(a)-(c).
26. Pursuant to § 7401 and the regulations, a civil action for the collection
of taxes cannot commence until the Commissioner or the Chief Counsel for
the Internal Revenue Service or his or her delegate authorizes the proceedings. Id. § 7401; Treas. Reg. § 301.7401-1(a), T.D. 7188, 1972-1 C.B. 376, 379.
Once a suit authorization is received from the Service, the case becomes the
responsibility of the Department of Justice's Tax Division. After formal review, the Justice Department determines whether judicial action is proper. If
foreclosure of the lien is deemed the appropriate method to collect the tax, a
trial attorney in the Tax Division in Washington is assigned to litigate the matter. Once the Service forwards the collection case to the Justice Department,
the Tax Division assumes complete authority to settle the dispute. All proposed settlements with the taxpayer must be approved by the Tax Division's
Review Section. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 14.09, at 14-46.
27. For a concise explanation of the procedures involved in foreclosing a
§ 6321 tax lien, see generally 4 B. BITTKER, supranote 11, 111.5.6; M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, q 14.09, at 14-47 to 14-48.
28. I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1982).
29. Although § 7403(c) requires that all parties be "duly notified of the action," no guidance is provided in either the statutory text or the relevant regulations regarding the specific notice requirements for an action initiated under
§ 7403. See id § 7403(c); Treas. Reg. § 301.7403-1, T.D. 7305, 1974-1 C.B. 339,
342.
30. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982). An action to enforce or foreclose a tax lien
is generally initiated when title to the property claimed to be subject
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The Administrative Levy

In addition to the Service's power to secure taxes by lienforeclosure, section 6331 permits the government to collect delinquent taxes by administrative levy. 31 The Service may use
the administrative levy procedure if the taxpayer fails to remit
the tax within the ten-day period subsequent to notice and demand. 32 The ten-day grace period may be ignored and the Service may proceed immediately, however, if it concludes that
collection would be "jeopardized by delay. '33 Unlike the lienforeclosure suit, the levy occurs prior to any adjudication.3 4
to the lien is in dispute, conflicting claims to a fund levied upon exist,
or the taxpayer employs many people and it is desired to sell the business as a going concern to preserve the jobs of the employees.
M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 14.09, at 14-47 n.10. Moreover, if the property
"is in [the] possession and control of a third person who either claims an interest or claims that someone else has an interest in the property that is superior
to the tax claim," the government will typically initiate a lien foreclosure action. Id.
31. Section 6331 provides in relevant part:
(a) Authority of Secretary
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for
the Secretary to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and
rights to property... belonging to such person or on which there is a
lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax....
(b) Seizure and sale of property
The term "levy" . . . includes the power of distraint and seizure
by any means .... [A] levy shall extend only to property possessed
and obligations existing at the time thereof. In any case in which the
Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize
and sell such property or rights to property ....
(c) Successive seizures
Whenever any property or right to property... is not sufficient
to satisfy the claim... the Secretary may, thereafter, and as often as
may be necessary, proceed to levy in like manner.., until the amount
due.., is fully paid.
(d) Requirement of notice before levy
(1) In general
Levy may be made under subsection (a) upon the.., property of
any person with respect to any unpaid tax only after the Secretary
has notified such person in writing of his intention to make such levy.
I.R.C. § 6331(a)-(d) (1982). For a thorough analysis of the administrative levy
statutory framework, see generally 4 B. BITTKER, supra note 11, 111.5.5; M.
SALTzMAN, supra note 11, 14.10-.18; Saltzman, supra note 11, 450-62.
32. See supra note 14.
33. See I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1982). The emergency procedures are described
supra note 21.
34. Under the administrative levy statutory framework, different procedures exist to effectuate the levy, depending upon the individual or entity possessing the taxpayer's property. If the asset is held by a third party, the
Service executes a formal levy by serving a notice of levy on the third party
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Seizure and sale may, therefore, occur prior to the determination of the parties' claims to the property.
When a delinquent taxpayer's property is held by another
individual or entity, the Service can demand the property by
serving a notice of levy on the third party pursuant to section
6332(a). 35 This notice of levy gives the Service the right to the
property36 and creates a custodial relationship between the
third party and the IRS such that the property comes into the
37
constructive possession of the government.
After seizure of the delinquent taxpayer's property pursuant to section 6331, section 6335 authorizes the Service to dispose of the asset. 38 The Service, however, must follow detailed
pursuant to § 6332(a). See I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982). When the taxpayer possesses the property, however, a levy is accomplished by seizure and sale of the
asset pursuant to § 6331(b). See id § 6331(b); M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11,
14.15, at 14-70 to 14-71.
35. Section 6332(a) provides, in relevant part:
[A]ny person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property
or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made
shall, upon demand of the Secretary, surrender such property or
rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary, except such part
of the property or rights as is ... subject to an attachment or execution under any judicial process.
I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982).
36. See United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1955).
37. Phelps v. United States, 421 U.S. 330, 334 (1975). The most common
custodial relationship occurs when the Service serves notice of levy on a bank.
See infra notes 60-96 and accompanying text. If a bank, as a third party, fails
to honor the levy request, the financial institution is subject to the civil penalties outlined in § 6332. See I.R.C. § 6332(c) (1982). Specifically, § 6332(c)(1)
imposes personal liability on a third party equal to the value of the property
or rights withheld, but not exceeding the amount of taxes for the collection of
which such levy has been made, if the notified third party does not surrender
the property or property rights. Id § 6332(c)(1). In addition, failure to honor
the notice of levy will result in a civil penalty equal to 50% of the value of the
property or property rights withheld, unless the third party has "reasonable
cause" for dishonoring the levy. IML § 6332(c)(2). The meaning of the "reasonable cause" language in § 6332(c)(2) is nebulous, however, and the regulations
provide little assistance in ascertaining the meaning of this phrase. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.6332-1(b)(2), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 386, 388.
Section 6332(d) exonerates a third party from liability to the delinquent
taxpayer upon complying with the levy. I.R.C. § 6332(d) (1982). The regulations indicate, however, that a person who "mistakenly surrenders to the
United States property or rights to property not properly subject to levy is not
relieved from liability to a third party who owns the property." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6332-1(c), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 386, 388 (emphasis added). Both the
Code and the regulations are curiously silent as to the status of a third party's
liability to a nondelinquent taxpayer who possesses joint ownership rights in
the property surrendered pursuant to the notice of levy. See I.R.C. § 6332(d)
(1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-1(c), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 386, 388.
38. Section 6335 provides:
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procedures throughout the cash-realization process. 3 9 Specifically, section 6335 requires that (1) a notice of seizure 40 and notice of sale4 l be delivered to the owner of the property seized,
,(2) a notice of sale be published in a county newspaper, 42 and
(3) the sale take place not less than ten or more than forty days
from the date of notice of sale.43 If the Service fails to comply
with these requirements, the sale will be voidable. 44
Although section 6331 grants the Service broad power to
seize property to satisfy a tax liability, the statutory language 45
and the related regulations 46 provide little guidance on when
the levy should be used. The decision to seize the property is
left to the discretion of the revenue officer, who is provided no
statutory standards for making the decision.47 If a taxpayer
(a) Notice of seizure
As soon as practicable after seizure of property, notice in writing
shall be given... to the owner of the property... or shall be left at
his usual place of abode or business if he has such within the internal
revenue district where the seizure is made. If the owner cannot be
readily located . . . the notice may be mailed to his last known
address....
(b) Notice of sale
The Secretary shall as soon as practicable after the seizure of the
property give notice to the owner, in the manner prescribed in subsection (a), and shall cause a notification to be published in some newspaper published or generally circulated within the county wherein
such seizure is made ....
I.R.C. § 6335(a)-(b) (1982).
39. See M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 1 14.17, at 14-81.
40. After seizing the property, the revenue officer must give timely written notice "to the owner of the property (or, in the case of personal property,
to the possessor thereof)." Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(a) (1954). The statutory
notice must include "the sum demanded," an inventory listing of any personal
property seized, and a "reasonable" description of any real property seized. Id.
41. The regulations vest the district director with the responsibility of
providing timely written notice of sale to the "owner" of the seized asset. The
written notice "must specify the property to be sold, and the time, place, manner, and conditions of the sale thereof, and shall expressly state that only the
right, title, and interest of the delinquent taxpayer in and to such property is
[being] offered for sale." Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1(b)(1), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B.
386, 391.
42. I&
43. I.R.C. § 6335(a)-(b), (d) (1982).
44. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 1 14.17[1], at 14-81 to 14-82. In response
to the conditions precedent established by § 6335, the Service has published
over 150 pages of detailed procedures to assist revenue agents in the seizure
and sale of levied assets. See 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) 11 531053(10)19, at 6531-6692 (Nov. 15, 1982).
45. Section 6331 is quoted in relevant part supra note 31.
46. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a)(1), T.D. 7620, 1979-1 C.B. 402-03; Treas.
Reg. § 301.6331-1(c), T.D. 7874, 1983-1 C.B. 345-46.
47. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, 1i 14.15, at 14-71 to 14-77. Application of
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has refused to cooperate with the officer, levy is usually made
without further notice. 48 The officer is, however, urged to consider the potential impact of the levy power on persons other
than the taxpayer, particularly if the focus of the levy is the
seizure of an operating business. 49 The Service has been
strongly criticized for not following this policy consistently.50
The administrative levy provision provides the Service with
an effective and powerful tool to collect the government's tax
revenues. To protect property owners from the wrongful use of
this device, Congress has provided two separate remedies for
the injured property owner. The regulations, promulgated
under section 6343(b), 51 provide an administrative remedy for
the return of the property. 52 In addition, section 7426 authorizes a person other than the taxpayer claiming an interest in
or lien on the levied property to institute a wrongful levy civil
action directly against the United States in federal district
court. 53 The court may grant an injunction if it concludes that
the levy is wrongful and that either the levy or the sale of the
property pursuant to the levy would irreparably injure rights of
a third party in the property that are superior to the rights of
the administrative levy by service personnel is not limited by rigid guidelines.
Provided the taxpayer has received proper "notice and demand" for the tax
pursuant to § 6303(a), the Service need not provide any additional pre-levy notice, unless the levy is directed at salary and wages. I& at 14-71. The Service,
however, has promulgated internal operating procedures that afford the taxpayer pre-levy notice. I& Prior to levy or seizure, "the Service notifies the
taxpayer of the contemplated action and, except in jeopardy situations, gives
the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to pay voluntarily." Id- Moreover,
although revenue officers have the discretion to serve a levy, the Service cautions the officers to use the levy authority "judiciously," because the careful
application of the administrative levy benefits the Service through improved
public relations. Id48. I& at 14-77.
49. I&
50. See infra notes 172-180 and accompanying text.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1, T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 393-94.
52. The regulations indicate that the injured party may submit a "written
request for the return of property wrongfully levied upon ... to the district
director .. . for the internal revenue district in which the levy was made."
Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(2), T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 394. Pursuant to the authority granted under § 6343(b), the district director may return "(1) the specific property levied upon, (2) an amount of money equal to the amount of
money levied upon, or (3) an amount of money equal to the amount of money
received by the United States from the sale of such property." I.R.C. § 6343(b)

(1982).
53. I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1) (1982). The statute also provides that "[s]uch action
may be brought without regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary or his delegate." Id.
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the United States. 54 The district court may also grant other
types of relief if it determines that the government's levy was
wrongful. 5
The administrative levy provision affords the Service with
broad power to collect the government's tax revenues. The
statutory structure of seizure, notice, sale, and post-seizure
challenge contains a flaw, however. The statute permits the
seizure of all property and rights to property5 6 of the delinquent taxpayer; this could apply to the taxpayer's interest in
jointly held property.57 Thus, it is questionable whether the
statute provides adequate notice to the nondelinquent joint
owners of the seized property.
In most situations, the statute does afford adequate notice.
The notice of seizure and notice of sale provisions of section
6335 provide for notice to "the owner" of the property prior to
54. Id § 7426(b)(1).
55. Id § 7426(b)(2). Section 7426 empowers the court to grant two possible remedies for wrongful levy, depending on whether the asset has been sold.
See id. § 7426(b)(2). If the property is still in the possession of the government, the court can order its return. Id. § 7426(b)(2)(A). If the asset was sold
prior to the wrongful levy action, the court may grant a money judgment "not
exceeding the greater of (i) the amount received by the United States from the
sale of such property, or (ii) the fair market value of such property immediately before the levy." Id § 7426(b)(2)(C).
56. See id § 6331(a). Although the statutory language of § 6331 subjects
all of the delinquent taxpayer's assets to levy by the Service, id- § 6331(a), this
all-inclusive language is limited by § 6334 of the Code, see id § 6334. Section
6334(a) exempts nine categories of property from levy: clothing, household
items, books and tools necessary for the taxpayer's business, unemployment
compensation, undelivered mail, payments under certain annuity and pension
plans, workmen's compensation, child support payments, and a minimum subsistence allowance. Id, § 6334(a)(1)-(9). Moreover, the notice of a § 6331 levy
does not operate to seize property acquired by the taxpayer or a third person
holding property of the taxpayer subsequent to the levy date. See id § 6331(c).
To reach such property, the Service must instead make successive levies until
the outstanding tax liability is liquidated. Id- The Service, however, is not required to make successive levies on salary and wages. Section 6331(e) provides
that "a levy on salary or wages payable to or received by a taxpayer shall be
continuous.., until the liability out of which such levy arose is satisfied or
becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." Id- § 6331(e)(1).
57. Section 6331 makes no mention of the Service's power to levy on property held jointly by the delinquent taxpayer and other individuals who have
satisfied their respective tax liabilities. See id- § 6331. Moreover, jointly
owned property is not listed as property exempt from levy under § 6334. See
id § 6334. The situation is also not addressed in the relevant treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a)(1), T.D. 7620, 1979-1 C.B. 402-03; Treas.
Reg. § 301.6334-1(a), T.D. 6870, 1966-1 C.B. 288, T.D. 7180, 1972-1 C.B. 390, T.D.
7182, 1972-1 C.B. 395, T.D. 7620, 1979-1 C.B. 403-04.
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sale.58 Yet certain types of property and rights to property do
not need to be seized and sold pursuant to section 6335 to realize the cash required to satisfy the delinquent tax. By far the
most common of these, and a very common target of the administrative levy, is the right to withdraw the funds contained in a
bank account. Because this asset is essentially cash, it does not
need to be seized and sold, and therefore the section 6335 notice
of seizure and notice of sale provisions do not apply. The right
of the Service to levy on joint bank accounts had never been
tested, however, until 1985, when the Supreme Court considered the question in United States v. National Bank of
59
Commerce.
II.

UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL BANK
OF COMMERCE

In United States v. National Bank of Commerce,60 the Internal Revenue Service brought suit 6 ' against an Arkansas
bank for collection of money62 held jointly by three depositors
in two accounts.6 3 The bank had refused to relinquish the
58. See supra notes 40-41.

59. 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985).
60. 554 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Ark. 1982), affd on othergrounds,726 F.2d 1292
(8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985).
61. After failing in its efforts to collect the outstanding tax liability of Roy
J. Reeves, the government served a notice of levy on the National Bank of
Commerce pursuant to I.R.C. § 6331(d), demanding that the bank remit to the
United States all sums the bank owed to Mr. Reeves up to a total of $1,302.56.
National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2922. When the bank refused to
honor the levy, the government instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas pursuant to I.R.C. § 6332(c)(1).

Id.
Section 6332(c)(1) provides in relevant part:
Any person who fails or refuses to surrender any property or rights to
property... shall be liable in his own person... in a sum equal to the
value of the property or rights not so surrendered, but not exceeding
the amount of taxes for the collection of which such levy has been
made ....
I.R.C. § 6332(c)(1) (1982).
62. After serving notice of levy on the bank, the Service executed a Partial Release of Levy which reduced the amount requested on the original levy
from $1,302.56 to $856.61. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2922.
63. On the date the notice of levy was served, the bank held $321.66 in a
checking account and $1,241.60 in a savings account, each in the names of "Roy
Reeves or Ruby Reeves or Neva R. Reeves." Id. at 2922.
At the time of this dispute, the relationship between the parties to a joint
bank account was governed by two Arkansas statutes. Section 67-521 authorized each of the account holders to make withdrawals from the account and
specifically released the bank from any subsequent liability for honoring such
requests unless one of the codepositors notified the institution of a change in
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funds pursuant to an administrative levy on the grounds that
only one of the codepositors was delinquent and that neither its
records nor the Service's notice disclosed the extent of the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the accounts.6
The case was submitted to the district court on cross motions for summary judgment and on the bank's motion to dismiss the complaint. 65 The district court concluded that due
process required stronger procedural protection than that afforded by a post-seizure lawsuit. 66 In the district court's opinion, due process required that the Service identify the
nondelinquent codepositors and provide them with notice and
an opportunity to be heard.67 The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss to give the Service the opportunity to obtain the
funds sought by means of the administrative levy in a manner
68
consistent with the court's due process analysis.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. 69 The Eighth Circuit,
70
however, expressed no opinion on the due process analysis.
The court instead reached the same result on the basis of statutory construction, holding that the Service must establish the
delinquent taxpayer's actual interest in the joint bank account
before seizing the funds. 7 ' The Eighth Circuit concluded that
the relationship. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-521 (1980), repealed by Act of March
25, 1983, § 2, 1983 Ark. Acts 2039, 2043 (substance of this statute is currently
codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-552(a) (1983)). Section 67-552 also granted
withdrawal rights to each of the named individuals on the account unless one
of the codepositors notified the bank in writing that the approval of more than
one codepositor was required to effectuate a transaction. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-552 (1980), amended by Act of March 25, 1983, § 1, 1983 Ark. Acts 2039,
2039-42.
64. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2922.
65. National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. at 111.
66. Id. at 114.
67. Id. at 114-15. The court applied a three-part analysis outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to ascertain what process is required
when the government issues a notice of levy against a joint bank account. The
court, after considering the interests of the innocent parties and the government, concluded that procedures exist that would "increase the probability of
insuring that no property interest of the co-depositor is taken while at the
same time adding minimal burdens upon the government in lawfully seizing
property for tax liabilities." NationalBank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. at 114.
68. NationalBank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. at 116-17.
69. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th
Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985).
70. Id. at 1293 ("We do not reach the constitutional questions decided by
the District Court.").
71. Id. The Eighth Circuit based its statutory conclusion on the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628 (6th Cir.
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because the rights of the various parties to the joint account
had not been determined, the government had not established
that the bank was in possession of the delinquent taxpayer's
property or property rights.7"
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Service
could rightfully levy on the joint accounts in question.73 The
Court's majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, noted
initially that under section 6332(a) of the Code a bank served
with a notice of levy has only two defenses for not honoring the
Service's request.74 One defense is that the bank is "neither 'in
possession of' nor 'obligated with respect to' property or rights
1958). In Stock Yards Bank, the Service served a notice of levy on the appellee
bank, which had in its possession 150 $25.00 Series E United States Savings
Bonds, each registered in the names of "Clarence J. Theobald or Mrs. Theas
Theobald." Clarence Theobald owed the government taxes, penalties, and interest totaling $129,960.67 for the years 1943 through 1946. Mrs. Theobald,
however, was not a delinquent taxpayer. The bank refused to honor the levy,
and the government brought suit to hold the financial institution personally
liable under I.R.C. § 3710 (1939), the predecessor statute to §§ 6331 and 6332 of
the present Code. Id. at 629.
The Sixth Circuit, in holding for the bank, initially noted that the bonds
were held in co-ownership form, which is not the equivalent of tenancy by the
entirety or joint ownership. Id. at 630. The court then indicated that federal
regulations and judicial decisions have recognized that the extent of a coowner's property interest is a question of fact and not of law. Id, at 631.
Therefore, under the language of the predecessor statute to I.R.C. § 6331,
"[p]roof of the actual value of the taxpayer's interest was an essential element
of the government's case under the statute, and for lack of such proof the case
falls." Id.
The Eighth Circuit, relying on its statutory analysis regarding the property interest created under state law and its conclusion that the government's
position was analogous to that of an ordinary creditor under Arkansas garnishment law, rejected the government's assertion that "'Stock Yards Bank took
place in a significantly different legal environment than the one here involved.'" National Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d at 1297 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 18). The court noted that the fact that the rights of the co-owners in
Stock Yards Bank depended on federal law, as opposed to state law, was a difference "without legal significance." 726 F.2d at 1297. The court concluded
that the difference "pertains only to the law governing the nature of the taxpayer's property rights. It has nothing to do with the operation of the levy
statutes on those rights, once their nature and extent are ascertained." Id.
72. NationalBank of Commerce, 726 F.2d at 1300. The court expressed no
concern about the possible adverse impact of its decision on the Service's ability to collect delinquent taxes under the levy provisions of the Code. Instead,
the court noted that "[t]he government is free to pursue the taxpayer's interest in the bank account in question by bringing suit to foreclose its lien under
Section 7403, joining as defendants the three co-owners of the account." Id.
73. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 2931 (1985).
74. Id. at 2925 (citing United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
494 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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to property belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. ' 75 The other
defense arises if the "taxpayer's property is 'subject to a prior
judicial attachment or execution.' "76 The Court concluded that
the only viable statutory defense available to the bank was that
the joint accounts did not constitute "'property or rights to
77
property'" of the delinquent taxpayer.
In determining whether the taxpayer's association with the
other codepositors constituted "property or rights to property"
under section 6331(a) of the Code, the Court concluded that
"'state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property.' "78 Once state
law has defined the nature of a taxpayer's interest in property,
however, the state law consequences of the definition are of no
concern to the operation of the federal tax law.7 9 The Court
concluded that the Eighth Circuit "applied state law beyond the
point of that law's specification of the nature of the property
right, and bound the IRS to certain consequences of state property law."80
The Court emphasized that the delinquent taxpayer had an
absolute right under both Arkansas state law81 and his contract
with the bank8 2 to withdraw any or all of the funds in the accounts.8 3 The Court found that this withdrawal right constituted "'property [or] rights to property'" under section 6331(a)
75. NationalBank of Commerce, 105 S.Ct. at 2925 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court dismissed consideration of the defense involving attachment or execution, noting that there was "no suggestion here that the Reeves
accounts were subject to a prior judicial attachment or execution." Id Moreover, the Court indicated that there was no "doubt that the bank was 'obligated with respect to' the accounts because... 'Roy Reeves did have a right
under Arkansas law to make withdrawals from the bank accounts in question.'" Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. National Bank
of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985)).
78. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2925 (quoting Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960)) (emphasis added). The Court added
that such a conclusion "follows from the fact that the federal statute 'creates
no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to
rights created under state law.'" 105 S. Ct. at 2925 (quoting United States v.
Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958)).
79. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2926 (citing United States v.
Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958)).
80. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2927 (emphasis added).
81. See supra note 63.
82. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2926.

83. 1&
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of the Code.8 4 Moreover, because the bank was obligated,
under Arkansas law, to honor any withdrawal request made by
any party to the joint accounts, the bank was obligated with respect to the taxpayer's right to that property under section
6332(a) of the Code.8 5 The Court thus concluded that the bank
had no justification for refusing to honor the levy because, in a
levy proceeding, the Service acquires the same rights as the
86
taxpayer.
The Court indicated, moreover, that the Eighth Circuit's
concern for the property interests of the nondelinquent codepositors failed to consider the statutory remedies established by
Congress to protect against wrongful levy.8 7 Justice Blackmun
indicated that other claimants may assert their rights because
the final judgment in a levy action settles no rights in the property subject to seizure.8 8 Congress, Justice Blackmun maintained, has balanced the interest of government in the timely
collection of taxes against the interests of any claimants to the
property, and reconciled these conflicting needs by permitting
the Service to levy on assets immediately.8 9 Any subsequent
ownership disputes can be resolved in a post-seizure administrative or judicial proceeding.9 0 The Eighth Circuit, therefore,
had no basis to ignore the congressional decision that "certain
property rights must yield provisionally to governmental
84. Id. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the majority's
conclusion, stating:
[T]he right to withdraw funds was no more than that. It was a right
accorded parties to joint accounts as a matter of mutual convenience
and it was independent of any right to or in the property. It encompassed no right of possession, use, or ownership over the funds when
withdrawn.
Id. at 2935 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
85. NationalBank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. at 2926.
86. Id. at 2926-27. In addition to its attack on the majority's treatment of
the taxpayer's right to withdraw, see supra note 84, Justice Powell's dissent
also asserted that the relevant Code provisions do not grant the Service the
right to levy on joint bank accounts when nondelinquent taxpayer property
rights are implicated. Id. at 2931 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, in
analyzing the statutory language of I.R.C. §§ 6331 and 7403, reasoned that
§ 6331 permitted the seizure and sale of property or property rights belonging
to the delinquent, while § 7403 allowed the government to seize and sell any
property right in which the delinquent has an interest-even a partial interest. Id. at 2933. As a result, Justice Powell concluded that "[a] property right
in which the delinquent has only a partial interest does not 'belon[g] to' the
delinquent and hence is not susceptible to levy." Id. at 2934.
87. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S.Ct. at 2928.

88. Id.
89. I& at 2929.
90. Id
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need." 91
Justice Blackmun's analysis of the statutory scheme failed,
however, to include a discussion of the adequacy of procedural
due process protection afforded to the nondelinquent codepositor.92 Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, identified
this flaw in the administrative levy procedure and observed
that the majority's result places "the property rights of third
persons in serious jeopardy. ' '9 3 The dissent concluded, however, that the statutory language was "dispositive" 94 and that
the analysis of the Eighth Circuit was correct.95 Therefore,
91. Id.
92. Justice Blackmun stated:
We do not pass upon the constitutional questions that were addressed
by the District Court, but not by the Court of Appeals, concerning the
adequacy of notice provided by § 6343(b) and § 7426 to persons with
competing claims to the levied property. There is nothing in the
sparse record in this case to indicate whether Ruby or Neva Reeves
were on notice as to the levy, or as to what the Government's practice
is concerning the notification of codepositors in this context.
Id. at 2929 n.12.
93. Id. at 2939 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, in criticizing the
majority's classification of the administrative levy as a "provisional" remedy,
asserted that:
one would hardly characterize as "provisional" the Government's taking of an innocent party's property without notice, especially when,
even if the taking is discovered, the burden is then on the innocent
party to institute recovery proceedings. Furthermore, absent notice of
any kind, the nine months that the administrative... and judicial ...
remedies ordinarily give third parties to contest a levy is a short time
indeed. There is no certainty that within this time they will discover
that their property has been used to pay someone else's taxes.... In
short, the Court's decision often will place the property rights of third
parties in serious jeopardy.
Id. at 2938-39.
Justice Powell also found fault in the majority's statement that the "'[the
levy] merely protects the Government's interests so that rights to the property
may be determined in a postseizure proceeding.'" Id. at 2938 n.12. He
concluded:
This statement incorrectly states the law. Under the levy statute, the
IRS has the power not only to seize but also to sell property. A coowner of a house seized and sold to pay a delinquent's taxes would indeed be surprised to discover that the IRS's levy "merely protects the
Government's interests .... ." Assuming that the co-owner discovered
within nine months that the IRS had levied on the property (for no
notice to him is required), he could recover in a wrongful levy action
at most some of the proceeds from the sale. This "remedy" hardly
"punctiliously protect[s]" the rights of third parties, as the Court
claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 2939 n.14.
95. Id. at 2939.
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Justice Powell also did not address the due process issue.96
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS INADEQUACIES
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVY
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In the NationalBank of Commerce case,97 both the majority and the dissent avoided consideration of the constitutional
question concerning the adequacy of notice provided by the administrative levy statutory scheme to persons with competing
claims to the levied property. 98 Application of the tenets of
procedural clue process to the statutory framework established
by Congress to protect against wrongful levy, however, reveals
that the administrative levy provisions of the Code fail to afford
minimum procedural due process protection to a nondelinquent
joint bank account holder.
A. BASIC TENETS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court has long held that the "root requirement" of procedural due process is the right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 99 The form of the notice 100
and the procedure for delivery or posting of the notice' 0 ' must
represent a legitimate effort to alert all interested parties to
the proposed government action. 10 2 The practicalities and peculiarities of a case, however, may result in different notice procedures that nonetheless satisfy the minimum constitutional
96. Id. at 2939 n.14.
97. See supra notes 60-96 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 92 and text accompanying note 96.
99. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (within the limits
of practicality a state must afford an individual a meaningful opportunity for a
hearing before deprivation of property).
100. The Supreme Court, in analyzing the notice requirement under the
due process clause, noted that "the notice must be of such nature as reasonand it must afford a reasonable
ably to convey the required information ....
time for those interested to make their appearance." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted).
101. The delivery or advertising of the notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Id
102. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 445, 455-56 (1982) (posting
notice of eviction action on door of apartment in public housing unit did not
satisfy constitutional due process standard); Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (notice of possible termination of utility service did not meet due process standard for informing the individual of the opportunity to present objections to termination).
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requirements. 10 3 Thus, where conditions render impractical
formal notice to interested parties, the notice will not be
deemed constitutionally deficient if the form chosen is the best
10 4
of the feasible and customary alternatives.
Postponement of procedural due process until after seizure
is justified only when extraordinary circumstances compel im06
mediate action. 10 5 The Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin,
stated that such situations arise when "the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest [and] there has been a special need for very
prompt action."'10 7 The Court also required that any seizure
prior to a hearing must operate under strict legal controls. 0 8
The action will be upheld only when "the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance."'10 9
The Supreme Court, in defining the parameters of procedural due process for persons whose property interests are im103. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950). For instance, notice by publication has been deemed constitutionally
sufficient "where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning." Id. at 317. The Mullane court noted that "in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably
futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights." Id. (citing Cunnis v.
Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905)).
104. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950). The Supreme Court outlined the due process hearing requirement in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Fuentes Court noted that "due process tolerates variances in the form of hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case." Id. at 82. The form of the hearing depends "upon the importance of the
interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Id.
Although the hearing required by due process is flexible in form and is subject
to waiver, "the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, the opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue
takes effect." Id. There are, however, "extraordinary situations" that justify
postponing notice and the opportunity for a hearing until after the property
seizure. I&L at 90. These situations must qualify as "truly unusual." Id
Seizure of property prior to a hearing has been permitted to collect taxes,
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931), to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947),
and to protect the public from misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950), and contaminated food, North Am.
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
105. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
106. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
107. Id. at 91.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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plicated, has held that the character and length of the
deprivation is irrelevant. 1 0 The Court, moreover, has indicated
that the Constitution's protection of "property" has never been
limited to safeguarding only the rights of undisputed ownership.11 ' Instead, the Constitution extends protection to any significant property interest. 1 2 Similarly, the invocation of the
Constitution's due process protection is not contingent upon the
magnitude of the property interest at stake." 3 Characterizing
the property interest as de minimis is not a legitimate justification for denial of procedural due process protection. 114
Before the government may deprive an individual of his or
her property, it must establish adequate procedures to ensure
that any action taken will comply with the due process
clauses. 1 5 In Mathews v. Eldridge,"16 the Supreme Court outlined a balancing test to determine what process is due when a
governmental action deprives an individual of a property interest.1 7 Under the Mathews test, a court must balance the importance of the property interest at stake and the extent to
110. 1I at 84-86. The Fuentes Court noted that "it is now well settled that
a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added). In addition, while the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be factors
influencing the form of the hearing, "it is not decisive of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind." Id. at 86.
111. i
112. I& (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
113. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 88-90.
114. Id at 90 n.21. The relative weight of the property interest is one of
the factors influencing the form of notice and hearing required by due process.
The Court indicated, however, that "some form of notice.., is required before
deprivation of a property interest that 'cannot be characterized as de
minimis."' Id. (emphasis in original).
115.

See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554

(2d ed. 1983). The due process procedure established by the government, however, does not have to guarantee the right to a hearing prior to state action.
See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 (1979) (post-suspension hearing for a
horse trainer sufficient where suspension is based on detection of illegal drugs
in the horse immediately after the race); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1979) (post-suspension hearing sufficient for suspending a person's driver's license for refusal to take a drunk-driving test); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974) (government seizure of ship used to
transport contraband permissible without prior hearing).
116. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
117. I& at 335. The Mathews case involved the termination of social security disability benefits and the due process protections afforded the claimant
under the fifth amendment. The Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing
is not required prior to the termination of the disability payments and that the
administrative procedures prescribed under the Social Security Act satisfied
due process. I&i at 349.
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which the suggested procedure mitigates the possibility of an
erroneous decision against the government's interest in avoiding the increased administrative and fiscal burdens that result
from the application of the procedure. 118 Courts applying the
Mathews test have permitted governmental deprivation of an
individual's property interest without a prior hearing only if adequate post-deprivation process is guaranteed. 19
B.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

DEFICIENCIES IN SECTION

6331

The right of the United States to collect its revenues by
summary administrative proceedings is one of the "extraordinary situations" justifying the postponement of procedural due
process. 20 In its analysis of the forerunner to sections 6343(b)
and 7426, the Supreme Court noted that "[w]here only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry
is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the
ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate."'' 1
The critical inconsistency in the administrative levy statutory framework is that the existence or nonexistence of procedural due process protection depends entirely on the type of
property interest seized by the Service. Under the current levy
framework, if the Service seizes a tangible asset under section
6331122 to satisfy the delinquent taxpayer's outstanding liability,
all owners of the asset are afforded adequate procedural due
process protection. 2 3 If the Service levies upon an intangible
118. Id at 335.
119. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 298-303 (1981) (order of partial or total cessation of surface mining
without a prior hearing does not violate due process when the mining operation creates an immediate danger to the health or safety of the public); Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (New York post-suspension hearing statute
deemed unconstitutional because it did not afford a timely hearing); Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (prompt post-suspension hearing sufficient for
suspending a person's driver's license for refusal to take a drunk-driving test).
120. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
121. Id. at 596-97. The Phillipsholding, although permitting the postponement of due process until after seizure, provides no guidance on what postseizure process is due. The taxpayer-stockholder in Phillipsreceived due notice that the Commissioner proposed to assess against and collect from him the
entire remaining amount of the deficiencies accrued by the Coombe Garment
Company prior to its liquidation. See id. at 591. The Court concluded that the
Commissioner's notice satisfied due process since the taxpayer was afforded an
adequate opportunity for judicial review of the assessment. Id at 597.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 31-55.
123. When the Service decides to seize and sell a delinquent taxpayer's tangible asset, it must comply with the strict procedural protections incorporated
in § 6335 of the Code. Specifically, the Service is required to give written no-
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asset, however, such as funds held in a joint bank account, the
section 6335 procedural protections 12 4 applicable to seized tangible assets are not triggered. 2 5 Instead, when the Service levies
and seizes the funds held in a joint bank account, the only statutory notice provided is the original demand served upon the
delinquent taxpayer under section 6331.26
This lack of notice to the nondelinquent joint account
holder implicates the overall effectiveness of the two statutory
tice to the "owner of the property" as soon as practicable after the seizure of
the asset. I.R.C. § 6335(a) (1982). Moreover, the Service must provide the
"owner" with notice of sale and cause newspaper publication of a notice specifying the property to be sold and the time, place, manner, and conditions of
the sale. Id § 6335(b). The requirements outlined in § 6335 "are conditions
precedent to the asset sale, and the Service's failure to follow them makes the
sale voidable." M. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, T 14.17[1], at 14-82.
Although § 6335 and the related regulations do not define the term
"owner," the Service has interpreted the language of this Code provision
broadly. Thus, the Service requires that "a copy of the notice of sale ... be
provided by regular mail to all interests of record (joint owners, senior and
junior lienholders, nominees, transferees, etc.)." 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) %56(13)7.1, at 6869 (Nov. 15, 1985). In addition, the IRS policy
manual requires the revenue agent to conduct a new search of the public
records to identify subsequently recorded interests if the original search of the
public records occurred over 90 days prior to the date of sale. Id.
In regard to tangible property, Justice Powell's concerns expressed in his
dissent, see supra note 93, are unwarranted. The procedural protections of
§ 6335, in combination with IRS policies regarding notices of sale, afford all
owners of the seized tangible asset adequate procedural due process.
124. See supra note 123.
125. Under the current levy framework, the § 6335 procedural protections
are applicable only when the Service proceeds to sell the seized asset to realize
cash. When the Service serves a notice of levy on a bank pursuant to § 6332,
however, the financial institution complies with the levy by disbursing cash.
Thus, the Service never has to comply with the notice requirements of § 6335
when it levies on the funds in a joint bank account because there is no need to
sell the asset. See I.R.C. §§ 6332, 6335 (1982).
126. At oral arguments in United States v. National Bank of Commerce,
105 S.Ct. 2919 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 73-96, Justice
O'Connor was concerned that all codepositors do not receive notice of the levy
when the Service levies on a joint bank account. Rosen, Supreme Court Will
Decide Fate of Tax Levies on Joint Bank Accounts, 27 TAX NOTES 350, 351
(1985). The government replied to this concern by stating that, under the language of §§ 6331 and 6332, the "IRS is not required to notify third parties." Id
The government's response to Justice O'Connor was utterly pragmatc.
The Service prefers to use its levy power on intangible assets such as bank accounts because it can completely avoid the procedural requirements of notice
of seizure and sale under § 6335. The Service justifies this preference by
claiming that "seizure and sale of tangible property involve a slow and drawnout process, often burdensome to the taxpayer, invariably costly for the IRS,
and usually unpleasant for all involved." Brief for Petitioner at 45, United
States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S.Ct. 2919 (1985).
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remedies available for wrongful levy. Under the present statutory framework, if the nondelinquent codepositor discovers that
his or her property interest in the joint account has been levied
and believes it was wrongful, his or her only recourse is to seek
administrative review under section 6343(b)m within nine
months or file suit in federal district court pursuant to section
29
7426128 within the same amount of time.1

The anomaly of this statutory scheme is that it saddles the
nondelinquent joint account holder with the burden of continually monitoring the intangible property interest to protect it
from government seizure. 130 This situation conflicts directly
with fundamental procedural due process policies. Due process
127. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

129. The administrative levy is considered a provisional remedy because it
serves to protect the government's potential tax revenue against diversion or
loss while the claims are being resolved. United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2925 (1985) (citing 4 B. BrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrS

1 111.5.5

(1981)). The enigmatic aspect of

this classification under the current statutory framework is that the nondelinquent codepositor's opportunity to make a claim utilizing the two post-seizure
remedies, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, is severely restricted.
Absent any notice of levy, the nine-month statute of limitations applicable to
the wrongful levy administrative and judicial remedies is a dangerously short
time for the nondelinquent codepositor to discover that his or her property has
been used to pay someone else's taxes. Justice Powell noted that "this may be
particularly true as to the owners of joint savings accounts ... where there
may be little occasion to know that one's property has been seized by an IRS
levy." 105 S.Ct. at 2939 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
130. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
the Supreme Court, in dictum, indicated that it is reasonable for the state to
assume that an owner of tangible property will continually monitor this interest. Id at 316 (emphasis added). The Court noted that "[t]he ways of an
owner with tangible property are such that he usually arranges means to learn
of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights." Id (emphasis
added). Thus, the Court concluded that "publication or posting affords an additional measure of notification" when the state seizes an individual's tangible
property. Id Significantly, although the property at issue in Mullane was intangible personal property, id at 309, the Supreme Court did not state that
owners have a similar responsibility to monitor their intangible property interests.
The most puzzling aspect of the current levy framework centers on why
Congress and the Service meticulously protect all interests in seized tangible
property, yet permit the taking of intangible property without affording any
procedural due process to the joint owners. The Subcommittee on Oversight
identified this discrepancy within the context of the Service's practice of indiscriminately levying on the bank accounts and accounts receivable of small
businesses. See infra text accompanying notes 172-180. This statutory discrepancy and its implications for joint bank accounts have never been examined by
Congress, however.
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imposes a duty on the government to follow a fair process of
decisionmaking when it acts to deprive persons of their possessions.' 3 ' This requirement serves to protect an individual's use
132
It
and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment.
or
mistaken
deprivaseeks to minimize substantively unfair
tions of property, a danger that is heightened when the state
seizes goods simply upon the request of and for the benefit of a
private party. 33 The prohibition against the deprivation of
property without due process of law reflects the high value this
nation traditionally has placed on an individual's right to enjoy
134
his or her property, free from government interference.
The Service defends its joint bank account levy notice procedure on the basis of statutory law and practical realities. The
Service contends that section 6331 L35 of the Code does not require notice to the nondelinquent codepositor when the government levies on a joint bank account. 136 Moreover, the Service
asserts that, as a practical matter, it is highly probable that the
codepositor will receive actual notice from either the bank or
137
the delinquent taxpayer.
The Service's argument that the statute relieves it of all
duty to notify, however, completely contradicts the Supreme
38
Court's reasoning in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams.
Under the provisions of the Indiana tax-foreclosure statute, the
county auditor was required to post notice of an impending tax
sale of real property in the county courthouse and to publish
notice once a week for three consecutive weeks. 139 The statute
mandated that the property owner be notified by certified
mail. 40 The statute, however, contained no provision for notice
by mail or personal service to mortgagees of the property.' 41
The Court, in holding that neither notice by publication and
posting nor mailed notice to the property owner were means
"such as one desirous of actually informing the [mortgagee]
131. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
132. Id at 81.
133. Id

134. Id
135. Section 6331 is quoted in relevant part supra note 31.
136. Rosen, supra note 126, at 351.
137. Goodly, Supreme CourtAffirms IRS Power to Levy on JointBank Accounts, 28 TAx NOTEs 124, 124 (1985).
138. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).

139. Id- at 792-93.
140. Id-at 793.
141. Id.
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stated the follow-

Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether
unlettered or well versed in commercial practice .... 143

The Mennonite Board of Missions Court adopted this actual notice principle even though the state statutory scheme required the publication of notice in a newspaper once each week
for three consecutive weeks.14 4 The Service, in contrast, provides no notice whatsoever when it levies on the funds held in a
joint bank account. 145 The Supreme Court's failure to apply
Mennonite Board of Missions to the National Bank of Commerce situation produces an anomalous result: although a
mortgagee must be notified when cash is realized from an asset
to satisfy a tax liability, the actual joint bank account holder
need not be notified when that asset is seized for the same purpose. The Court's reasoning in Mennonite Board of Missions
mandates that the Service must provide notice to all account
146
holders, regardless of the terms of the statute.
The Service's "practical realities" justification, 147 moreover,
cannot be relied upon to satisfy the Constitution's procedural
due process requirements. The Service cannot shift the burden
of giving required notice to any other party. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,148 the Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by a party to a legal proceeding to shift the cost of
providing notice to another party. 49 In that case the Court
142. Id. at 799 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
143. Mennonite Board of Missions, 462 U.S. at 800 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 793. The Court discounted the published notice because it was
"designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to the tax sale" and was
"unlikely to reach those who, although they have an interest in the property,
do not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices." Id. at 799.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 122-126.
146. In Mennonite Board of Missions, the Court noted that a mortgagee
has a legally protected property interest that entitles the mortgagee to notice
of the pending tax sale. Mennonite Board of Missions, 462 U.S. at 798. Similarly, in National Bank of Commerce, the Court concluded that a delinquent
taxpayer's right to withdraw from a joint bank account was a property interest
subject to levy. See United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct.
2919, 2927 (1985). Therefore, it follows that the nondelinquent codepositor also
possesses a property interest subject to the Mennonite Board of Missions notice protections.
147. See supra text accompanying note 137.
148. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
149. Id. at 175.
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held that if the cost of notifying more than 2,000,000 potential
class members was greater than the plaintiff could bear, then
the plaintiff's class action motion must fail for lack of due process. 150 Here the Service argues that it can shift the burden of
notice to the banks or to the delinquent taxpayer. 151 It is not
the responsibility of these parties, however, to ensure that all
parties affected by the Service's seizure of money are properly
52
notified.
Even if the burden of notice is placed upon the other parties, there is no guarantee that it actually will be satisfied. Reliance on the delinquent taxpayer, who may be benefitting from
the satisfaction of his or her tax liability with another's funds,
is clearly misplaced. 53 Procedures for notice to depositors vary
widely among banks, depending on the size and sophistication
of the financial institution. Some parties to joint accounts may
receive absolutely no notice of the levy debit.M Others who re150. Id, at 177.
151. See Goodly, supra note 137, at 124.
152. The Court noted in Eisen that "the usual rule is that a plaintiff must
initially bear the cost of notice to the class." Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. The Court
added that this rule is particularly applicable when "the relationship between
the parties is truly adversary." Id. at 178-79.
153. The delinquent taxpayer's motive not to disclose the seizure is particularly acute when all the funds in the joint account were deposited by another
party. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
the Supreme Court observed that notice to a resident fiduciary of a trust account cannot be construed as actual notice to the beneficiaries when circumstances create an adversarial relationship between the fiduciary and the
beneficiaries. Id. at 316. Likewise, it is fallacious to conclude that a delinquent
taxpayer will notify his adversaries (codepositors) after the funds have been
surrendered to the government.
A codepositor's knowledge of the delinquent taxpayer's plight with the
IRS, moreover, is not necessarily sufficient notice of a potential levy on the
joint account. The Mennonite Board of Missions Court noted that "a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to
notice that a tax sale is pending." Mennonite Board of Missions, 462 U.S. at
800.
154. Discussions with seven banks in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area during
the week of January 27, 1986, revealed a definite lack of uniformity in dealing
with levies served on joint bank accounts. Smaller institutions either call or
write only the delinquent taxpayer and state that they are disbursing funds to
the government. The larger banks, in addition to notifying the delinquent taxpayer, also make an effort to notify any codepositors by sending a formal letter
and a copy of the notice of levy to the address where the monthly statements
are mailed. Telephone interviews with account personnel at seven major Twin
Cities banks (week of Jan. 27, 1986) (names and telephone numbers of banks
and bank officers on file in the offices of the Minnesota Law Review). This
voluntary effort to notify codepositors can hardly be classified as a "means ...
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
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ceive bank statements will only see a single debit entry on an
account statement. 155 This type of incidental notice is roughly
analogous to the small-print public notice of sale, placed on the
back page of a local newspaper, found inadequate to provide notice to a mortgagee in Mennonite Board of Missions. Moreover,
the notice's form must be "'reasonably calculated' to inform
[the parties] of the availability of an 'opportunity to present
their objections.' 1356 A debit entry on an account statement
cannot be said to perform this function.1 57
Even if the joint depositors do receive adequate and timely
notice of the levy, however, the statute still may be void. Section 6331 authorizes the taking of a jointly owned property interest without expressly providing for notice to all interested
parties.'5 8 In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 59 the Supreme Court reviewed a New Jersey statute that permitted a resident of the
state to serve process on the Secretary of State for actions
against a nonresident motor vehicle operator. 160 The Court
concluded that the statute violated the defendant's due process
rights even though the defendant had actual notice because the
provision contained no language requiring either the Secretary
of State or the plaintiff to communicate notice of service to the
adopt to accomplish it." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
155. The seven banks in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area contacted during
the week of January 27, 1986, do not present a separate disclosure highlighting
the levy debit on the joint account statement. In addition, the banks do not
send out duplicate copies of the statement containing the levy debit to all individuals named on the account. Telephone interviews with account personnel
at seven major Twin Cities banks (week of Jan. 27, 1986) (names and telephone numbers of banks and bank officers on file in the offices of the Minnesota Law Review).
156. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). Unless the bank's notice specifically apprised the codepositors of the statutory
remedies available for wrongful levy, see supra text accompanying notes 51-55,
the notice would still result in a deprivation of due process.
157. If by chance the nondelinquent codepositors received the bank statement and subsequently managed to identify the levy debit, such notice still
may not satisfy due process. The Supreme Court, in concluding that publication in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to apprise the property owner of New York City's plan to divert a portion of the Neversink River,
noted that the property owner's "knowledge of a change in the appearance of
the river is far short of the notice that the city had diverted it and that the
appellant had a right to be heard on a claim for compensation for damages resulting from the diversion." Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214
(1962).
158. See supra text accompanying note 126.
159. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
160. Id. at 16-17.
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161

nonresident defendant.
The National Bank of Commerce decision reaffirmed the
Service's broad power to use the administrative levy on "all
property and rights to property" belonging to the delinquent
taxpayer. 16 2 The decision also expanded the definition of
"property" subject to administrative levy by permitting the
seizure of funds held in a joint bank account.' 63 In expanding
the reach of the administrative levy, however, the Court ignored the procedural inadequacies of both the language of the
statute and the practices of the Service. Neither the statute nor
the Service's procedures provide for adequate notice of a levy
on a joint bank account to the nondelinquent coholders of the
account.
The importance of this decision is underscored by a significant increase in the use of the administrative levy in recent
years.L64 This increased application greatly increases the risk of
placing the property rights of nondelinquent joint account holders in serious jeopardy. Congress, although cognizant of the
dramatic increase in the application of the administrative levy
collection procedure, has failed to implement any procedural
protections to mitigate the correspondingly increased risk of injury to the nondelinquent codepositor.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE GROWING
RISK OF INJURY TO NONDELINQUENT
CODEPOSITORS
The Service's increased application of the Code's collection
65
provisions is partially attributable to the significant growth
161. Id- at 18-19. The Court considered it irrelevant that the defendant
eventually did receive actual notice by service. Instead, the Court declared
that "[the defendant] did not... appear in the cause and such notice was not
required by the statute. Not having been directed by the statute, it can not,
therefore, supply constitutional validity to the statute or to service under it."

Id- at 24.
162. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2931
(1985).
163. Id at 2926-27.
164. See infra note 185.
165. For example, in fiscal year 1946, total internal revenue collections
were a mere $40.7 billion. See COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 54 [hereinafter cited as 1984 ANNUAL REPORT]. Over a period of 38 years, total revenue collections increased
approximately 1572% to $680.5 billion. See id. (percentage calculated by author). During 1946, the Service was responsible for collecting $1.7 billion in
employment-related taxes. Id. In fiscal 1984, however, the Service gathered
approximately $199.2 billion from employers. Id. The collection of individual
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in the dollar volume of revenue collections. Simultaneously
with this tremendous growth in revenue collection responsibility, recent actions by taxpayers and Congress have necessitated
increased use of the statutory collection provisions by the Service. During the 1980's, the Service encountered the growing
phenomenon of the illegal tax protester. 66 In fiscal year 1982
alone, for example, the Service examined approximately 41,300
67
illegal protest returns.
Congress, moreover, has not funded the Service's efforts to
improve collection results. From fiscal 1979 to 1984, the total
congressional appropriation to the Internal Revenue Service increased an average of only 9.2 percent per year.168 As a result,
the Service is currently allocating a larger proportion of its
income and corporate income and profits taxes has also increased at an astounding rate. In fiscal 1975, individual and corporate tax collections totaled
$202.1 billion. Id Over a period of nine years, however, these tax collections
increased to $437.1 billion. Id Individual income tax collections, which were
$156.4 billion, or 77.4% of the total income and profits taxes collected in fiscal
1975, were $362.9 billion and accounted for 83.0% of the $437.1 billion of individual and corporate taxes collected in fiscal 1984. See i&. (percentages calculated by author).
166. The IRS groups as "tax protesters" those individuals who
[claim] the right to stop paying taxes on moral or constitutional
grounds. In the mid-1960s, when the Service began [compiling statistics], fewer than a thousand protest returns a year were filed, mostly
by people objecting to the Vietnam war. Since then a minor nuisance
has grown into a major problem: in 1983 the IRS identified over
58,000 protest returns. And since protest leaders often advise their
followers simply not to file a return, protesters have undoubtedly
helped swell the ranks of the estimated six million nonfilers.
To beat down this challenge, the IRS has targeted flagrant offenders for criminal prosecution. Usually these are tax-protest
profiteers, who use the mails and telephone hotlines to sell tax-avoidance schemes based on crackbrained "Constitutional" arguments. In
exchange for a fee of up to $2,000 and a "vow of poverty," for example, Jerome Daly, self-proclaimed pope of the Basic Bible Church, offered his "ministers" exemption from federal taxes. [In 1983,] Daly
was sentenced to 16 years in prison and fined $95,000. Seven of his
ministers, all former Braniff Airways pilots, were also hit with prison
sentences.
Putting the Heat on Tax Protesters,FORTUNE, Apr. 2, 1984, at 84.
167. See COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 11 [hereinafter cited as 1982 ANNUAL REPORT].
The illegal protest problem appears to have abated somewhat. Although the
number of illegal protest returns examined in fiscal 1983 had increased to
54,871, COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1983
ANNUAL REPORT 12 [hereinafter cited as 1983 ANNUAL REPORT], in 1984, the
number examined declined to 51,895, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, at
14.
168. For the years 1979 to 1984, total obligations, appropriations and reimbursements to the Internal Revenue Service were as follows:
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annual congressional appropriation to the collection of outstanding tax liabilities. 169 Congress's failure to fund the tax
collection function adequately has forced the Service to utilize
the cost-effective administrative levy procedure to secure delinquent taxes. 170
Fiscal
Year
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979

Amount (in thousands)
Percentage Increase
3,295,538
10.3
2,988,105
13.3
2,637,629
6.3
2,480,576
8.2
2,291,776
7.9
2,123,271
1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, at 71; 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
167, at 61; COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1980
ANNUAL REPORT 77 [hereinafter cited as 1980 ANNUAL REPORT] (percentages
calculated by author).
169. In fiscal 1978, for example, the Service expended $258.3 million to collect delinquent taxes. COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 71 [hereinafter cited as 1979 ANNUAL

REPORT]. The fiscal 1978 collection expenditure was approximately 42.6% of
the $606.4 million disbursed by the Service for investigation, collection, and
taxpayer service. See id (percentage calculated by author). Over a period of
six years, however, the Service has significantly increased disbursements for
delinquent tax collections relative to total investigative, collection, and taxpayer service expenditures. After a brief proportional decline in fiscal years
1979, see ia (41.2% of $680.6 million total) (percentage calculated by author),
and 1980, see 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 168, at 77 (41.4% of $720.2 million total) (percentage calculated by author), collection expenditures increased
to $604.1 million in fiscal 1984, accounting for 59.0% of the Service's $1,024.1
million investigation, collection, and taxpayer service disbursements. See 1984
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, at 71; see also 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 167, at 61 (43.4% of $804.3 million total in 1981 and 47.2% of $868.9 million
total in 1982); 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 65 (53% of $998.3 million total) (percentages calculated by author).
170. The Service's application of the statutory collection tools, in combination with the increased allocation of funds to collection and enforcement activities, has generated a positive return on investment for the Treasury. In fiscal
1984, Service collection personnel assessed nearly 1.5 million delinquency penalties relating to individual income taxes, totaling $447 million. 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 165, at 67. Total dollar value of individual income tax delinquency penalties assessed in fiscal 1984 increased approximately 17% from
the prior year. Compare i&L with 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 61
($381 million individual income tax penalties assessed) (percentage calculated
by author). Moreover, over a period of six years, total dollar value of individual income tax delinquency penalties abated has increased from the fiscal 1978
level of $25.8 million, COMMISSIONER & CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 95, to $92.0 million in 1984, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, at 67. The most startling statistic related to this resource
allocation, however, is the increase in the dollar amount of delinquent taxes
collected by the Service. In fiscal 1978, the Service collected approximately
$4.3 billion in delinquent taxes. See 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 169, at
21. Over a period of six years, however, this amount has increased approxi-
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Internal Revenue statistics disclose that the increased application of the administrative levy has significantly improved
the Service's efficiency in the collection of delinquent taxes. 171
As a result of the procedural inadequacies of the levy, however,
the Service's increased utilization of this collection device significantly increases the risk of jeopardizing the property rights
of nondelinquent codepositors.
Although Congress has expressed concern over the notice
deficiency in section 6331, it has failed to implement any legislation to improve the procedural due process protection under
this Code provision. In October 1980, the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management issued a scathing report
regarding the Service's application of the administrative levy
against small businesses. 172 The report contained numerous
criticisms 17 3 and recommendations 174 relating to tax collection
mately 137% to $10.2 billion in 1984. See 1984 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note
165, at 19 (percentage increase calculated by author).
171. The amount of revenue collected from each dollar spent by the Service on direct enforcement activities increased, in constant fiscal 1983 dollars,
from $5.46 in fiscal 1980 to $9.70 in fiscal 1984. See 1984 Senate Hearings,
supra note 4, at 149 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) (collections per dollar expended calculated by author).
172. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., REPORT ON INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE COLLECTION PRACTICES-IMPACT ON SMALL BusINEss (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The report was developed from a July 31, 1980, hearing focusing on IRS
"collection practices and their effect on small businesses." Id, at 1; see IRS
Summary Collection Policy Impact on Small Business: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Managementof the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate
Hearings].
173. Specifically, the Subcommittee concluded that the Service was violating "its own formal policy by taking excessive and harsh enforcement actions
against small businesses without considering all its available collection alternatives." SENATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 3. Moreover, the Service was admonished for using "closed-case and seizure and levy statistics as a principal
measure of collection effectiveness [without showing] any correlation between
the number of closed-cases or seizures and the amount of taxes actually recovered." Id. at 3-4. The Subcommittee also concluded that "IRS' group managers abuse their supervisory review authority and require Revenue Officers to
take harsh unnecessary enforcement actions contrary to the [officers'] professional judgment and individual discretion... ." Id at 4.
174. The Subcommittee presented numerous recommendations based on its
finding of excessive and harsh enforcement actions by the Service against
small businesses. For example, the Subcommittee urged Congress to amend
§ 6325(b)(1) to require the IRS to make a timely "assessment of the fair market value of liened property and [to] retain a lien on a part of the property
equal in value to no more than double the amount of the tax delinquency." I&
at 4. Moreover, the Subcommittee recommended that the IRS "immediately
issue a memorandum reiterating a formal national policy toward seizures of
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practices and procedures. As a result, the Subcommittee proposed both statutory and administrative changes affecting the
Service's application of the administrative levy collection tool.
In response to complaints that the Service was indiscriminately levying on the bank accounts and accounts receivable of
small businesses to collect delinquent social security trust fund
payments without affording adequate notice, 175 the Subcommittee urged that the administrative levy provision 176 of the Code
be amended "to require that current notice provisions in section 6335 applicable to seizures be extended to levy actions as
well. '177 The Subcommittee suggested that the amendment require written notice to the taxpayer as soon as practicable after
levy of taxpayer property. 78 The Subcommittee indicated that
effective notice would require that the notice be given to the
taxpayer or left at his or her home or business. 17 9 The Service
resisted the Subcommittee's proposed amendment to section
on-going businesses." Id. at 5. The Subcommittee also suggested that the IRS
policy manual "be revised to require that installment pay plans be used for
business taxpayers with no prior history of delinquent [social security] trust
accounts." Id.
The Subcommittee also formulated a four-part recommendation based on
its finding that the Service relied on collection statistics without verifying the
cost effectiveness or the debt recovered. The crux of the recommendation was
that the Service should institute a study to determine whether there is any
correlation between the collection statistics, the use of various enforcement
tools, and the actual debt recovered. d.
175. Numerous complaints were voiced concerning the Service's practice of
levying on accounts receivable and bank accounts of small businesses. The
Subcommittee noted that, because the Service is not required to notify the
business taxpayer when it levies on these two forms of intangible assets, such
action can have a detrimental impact on the taxpayer's reputation and credit
standing in the business community. Id at 9-10. Specifically, regarding levies
on business bank accounts, the Subcommittee concluded:
Levies on checking accounts require no notice to the taxpayer, so that
a taxpayer's first word of such a levy comes when its checks to creditors are returned as a result of levy. The damage to the business'
credibility in the eyes of its colleagues and essential supplies [sic] is a
very real threat to a business' survival.
I& at 10.
176. See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
177. SENATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 4. For a discussion of the notice
provisions of § 6335, see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. The Subcommittee also recommended the following revision to Internal Revenue Policy Statement P-5-34: "The facts and circumstances of the particular case must
be thoroughly considered before a decision is reached to levy againsta going
business or to seize a going business and offer it for sale under levy proceedings." SENATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 4 (revision in italics).
178. SENATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 4.
179. I&
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6331, however, and the suggested revision never became law. 8 0
While the Subcommittee was conducting its investigation,
Senator Max Baucus introduced a bill to amend the Internal
Revenue Code to provide greater protection for taxpayers'
rights.' 8 ' The bill, entitled "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights Act,"
82
proposed a six-point program of specific taxpayer protections.,
The most significant protection in the amendments focused on
the prevention of unwarranted seizure of taxpayer property.
Specifically, Senator Baucus proposed an amendment to section
6331 that would have required procurement
of a court order
83
prior to any levy action by the Service.
180. The Commissioner's response to the findings and recommendations of
the Subcommittee was defensive. Regarding the Subcommittee's finding concerning levies, the Commissioner responded that "[w]hile there may be instances in which notices of levy are precipitously issued by IRS Collection
personnel, we do not believe that the record of the Service as a whole would
support the Subcommittee's finding." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Export Opportunitiesand Special Small Business Problems of the House Comm.
on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 373, 377 (1983) (letter from the Acting
Commissioner of the IRS to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management). Moreover, the Commissioner's response to the Subcommittee's proposed amendment to make the written notice
requirement of § 6335 applicable to levies as well as seizures was predictable.
The Commissioner asserted that "[t]o apply similar procedures to the far more
frequent use of notices of levy would substantially increase the cost of issuing
such notices by... making it impossible for the Service to fully utilize its Collection Office function . . . personnel." Id. at 378. The Commissioner concluded that, while the taxpayer "would receive no additional material
protections, .... the cost of collecting delinquent accounts would increase sub-

stantially." Id.
181. At the date of the bill's introduction, Senator Baucus was a member of
the Finance Committee and Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee of the
Internal Revenue Service. See 1980 Senate Hearings,supra note 172, at 28.
182. S. 2825, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 14,416-18 (1980). The first
five proposed protections would have:
(1) Established an office of ombudsman to act as an advocate for
the taxpayer in dealings with the IRS;
(2) Exempted all back taxes and penalties if the IRS failed to issue regulations within 18 months of passage of the new Code provision;
(3) Removed the requirement of small businesses to file W-2
forms in mid-year when an employee terminates his position with the
business;
(4) Ended the requirement for declarations of estimated tax
when no payment is due; and
(5) Protected tax preparers from unwarranted penalties.
1980 Senate Hearings,supra note 172, at 29.
183. Under the proposal, "any Federal judge or any judge of a State court
of record within the district wherein the property (or right to property) to be
levied upon [was] located" could issue the order. S. 2825, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 3, 126 CONG. REC. 14,416-17 (1980). The judge, however, could act only if the
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The introduction of the "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights Act"
and the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Oversight
reveal that some legislators are aware of the procedural due
process weaknesses in the administrative levy provision of the
Code. Congress, however, has not enacted any legislation to improve procedural protections under section 6331.184 The Service, moreover, has dramatically increased its use of the
administrative levy'8 5 without any significant modification in
levy practices and procedures regarding joint bank accounts.
This increase, together with Congress's failure to provide adequate procedural due process protection to all property owners
under the levy provision, leaves the property rights of nondelinquent joint bank account holders in serious jeopardy, absent
any protection from the courts.
V.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the due process inadequacies of the administrative levy procedure in Na86
The issue remains, however, and
tional Bank of Commerce.1
in the absence of congressional action, the property interests of
nondelinquent joint account depositors are unprotected. Judicial protection should be provided. As an alternative to voiding
section 6331,187 courts could void all levies conducted by the
Service established that the requirements of § 6331 were satisfied and the
judge determined "that there was reasonable cause to believe that such requirements [were] met." See id-, 126 CONG. REC. at 14,417.
184. S. 2825 was referred to the Finance Committee. See 126 CONG. REC.
14,414 (1980). The bill, however, was never enacted.
185. Collection activity involving the administrative levy has increased
sharply. In fiscal 1978, the Service reported slightly over 5,000 seizures of taxpayer property. In fiscal 1984, however, the Commissioner disclosed that collection personnel effectuated approximately 20,000 seizures. Moreover, the
number of notices of levy served upon third parties has increased over 233%
from fiscal 1978 to fiscal 1984. See 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 169, at 66;
1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 165, at 66 (percentage increase calculated by
author). Specifically, the number of levies served on banks during fiscal 1981
totalled 308,622. In fiscal 1984, however, the Service served approximately
600,000 notices of levy on financial institutions. Brief for Petitioner at 41 n.29,
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985). In addition, during the past three and a half years, the Service has served notices of
levy on approximately 800,000 joint bank accounts. I& at 41.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 158-161. Under the current levy
framework, § 6331 operates harmoniously with other Code provisions when
the Service seizes tangible property. See supra text accompanying notes 122123. The only inconsistency in § 6331 materializes when the Service levies on
a joint bank account. Thus, as a practical matter, courts should avoid invali-
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Service in which the Service fails to deliver timely, adequate
notice to all parties with an interest in the seized joint bank
18
accounts. 1
The notice sent to the nondelinquent joint account holders
would have to specify that the funds in the account are being
seized for delinquent taxes. More importantly, the notice
would have to clearly advise the codepositors that remedies are
available if their property interest has been wrongfully taken
by the government.18 9
This notice procedure would comply with the Mennonite
Board of Missions due process notice requirements1 90 and
strike the requisite balance dictated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge.191 The minimal increase in the government's burden resulting from compliance with the Mennonite
Board of Missions notice requirements clearly would be outdating § 6331 when less disruptive alternatives are available to correct the due
process deficiency.
188. The Service has expressed concern that such a procedure would impose on them the impossible burden of proving the ownership interests of the
codepositors. Brief for Petitioner at 42, United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985). There is no language in the relevant levy
provisions, however, that requires the government to shoulder the burden of
establishing ownership interests. See I.R.C. §§ 6331-6332 (1982). Moreover, the
suggested notice procedure does not delegate this burden to the Service.
Under the notice procedure, the bank would still surrender the funds to
the Service pursuant to § 6332. The sole purpose of the notice requirement is
to inform the nondelinquent codepositor as soon as practicable after compliance by the bank that his or her property interest may have been seized and
that remedies are available for wrongful seizure. There is no requirement that
the Service establish ownership at any time prior to the nondelinquent codepositors' initiating a wrongful levy action under either § 6343(b) or § 7426.
189. Without this express disclosure, the substance of the notice would not
satisfy the requirements established by the Supreme Court in Memphis Ligh4
Gas & Water Division. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978).
The government implies that providing notice to joint account holders will
result in a massive increase in litigation, costing the government "tens of millions of dollars." Brief for Petitioner at 44, United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985). This increase in litigation, moreover,
"would impose a tremendous strain on the federal courts." Id These observations, however, conflict with an earlier statement in which the government
claimed that "[v]ery few of these cases [levies on joint bank accounts] resulted
in litigation, be it an enforcement action by the Commissioner or a wrongful
levy action by the co-depositor. Rather, the bank simply paid the funds to the
IRS, the taxpayer acquiesced, the co-depositor raised no objection, and no one
ever went to court." Id at 41. On the basis of this historical observation, it is
difficult to imagine an "explosion" in future litigation merely from providing
notice to nondelinquent codepositors.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 138-143.
191. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
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weighed by mitigation of the risk that the nondelinquent joint
account holder's property interest was seized unfairly. 192 Moreover, if a notice procedure were implemented, the Service's use
of the administrative levy would be supported by those
Supreme Court decisions that have permitted takings without a
prior hearing, provided a post-deprivation hearing was guaranteed. 93 If timely and adequate notice is given to all concerned
parties, the post-seizure remedies of the Code will serve the
purpose for which they were designed: the protection of the
rights of the nondelinquent taxpayer.
Michael J. Young

192. The Service's response to this conclusion is predictable. The Service
would claim that the requirement of notice to all joint bank account holders
"would make administrative levies so burdensome as to be impractical whenever a delinquent taxpayer's property is titled in more than one name." Brief
for Petitioner at 42, United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct.
2919 (1985). Moreover, the Service would argue that such a procedure is both
costly and inefficient. See id at 44.
The Service's response, however, appears to ignore the realities of the
banking industry. Discussions with account personnel at Marquette Bank
Minneapolis, Norwest Bank Minneapolis N.A., First Bank Minneapolis, and
Twin City Federal Savings & Loan Association during the week of January 27,
1986, revealed that the application forms for joint accounts require the names
and addresses of all parties to the accounts. Telephone interviews with four
Twin Cities banks (week of Jan. 27, 1986) (names and telephone numbers of
banks and bank officers on file in the offices of the Minnesota Law Review).
In addition, every joint account holder is required to list his or her social security number on the application. By working with the bank and the delinquent taxpayer, the Service should experience minimal difficulty in notifying
all codepositors.
193. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. As the administrative levy
framework currently operates, the lack of any notice to a nondelinquent codepositor does not guarantee a post-deprivation hearing or remedy. See supra
text accompanying notes 127-129.

